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I. INTRODUCTION
Peanut-themed parks,1 barista training,2 and cash donations supporting
environmental causes3 might seem unrelated to the casual observer. In fact,
these endeavors represent a global effort by corporations to increase their
charitable giving and undertake socially responsible behavior that benefits
their employees, consumers, and communities. At a time when popular
movements rage “against greed, corporate influence, gross social inequality
and other nasty byproducts of wayward capitalism,”4 corporate social
responsibility initiatives are particularly relevant because they represent the
nexus between corporate action, government regulation, and the welfare of
individual citizens.
Popular distaste for corporations is not a new phenomenon.
Contemporary scholars have addressed perceived problems with corporate
misbehavior since the 1970s.5 As corporations continue to grow ever larger
and acquire more global influence, the actions they take have the potential to
affect individuals, environments, and states around the globe.
American and Chinese companies are arguably the most influential in the
world. The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies,6
and China is the United States’ second largest, and most important nonNorth American, trade partner.7 In 2009, “U.S. goods and services trade
with China totaled $390 billion.”8 The following year, the total goods trade
between China and the U.S. was $457 billion.9 Given the enormity of the
1

Lisa W. Foderaro, Offbeat Corporate Giving: A Park Inspired by Peanuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2011, at A25.
2
Julie Jargon, Starbucks Pushes to Create Jobs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011, at B6.
3
Adam Najberg, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Says He’s Misunderstood, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT
(Oct. 20, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/10/20/alibabas-jack-ma-sa
ys-hes-misunderstood/.
4
Ginia Bellafante, Gunning for Wall Street, With Faulty Aim, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011,
at MB1.
5
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at SM17.
6
Gross Domestic Product 2010, WORLD TIMES, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATA
STATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
7
Top Ten Countries with Which the U.S. Trades: For the Month of August 2011, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2011/08/balance.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2013); The World Factbook: China, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Aug. 19,
2013).
8
The People’s Republic of China, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china
(last
visited Aug. 19, 2013).
9
Id.
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economic partnership between the United States and China, the approaches
the two countries take towards implementing corporate social responsibility
will undoubtedly have global effects. Therefore, it is important to develop a
keen understanding of their respective approaches to Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) and the implications their implementation methods
have for corporations that conduct business worldwide and touch the lives of
billions of people.
The differing approaches to corporate social responsibility seen in the
People’s Republic of China and the United States demonstrate the strengths
and weaknesses of CSR. A comparative study examining the social and
legal history of CSR initiatives in both China and the United States will shed
light on the different approaches and reveal a more effective model for the
future.
This Note addresses the origins and history of CSR, compares the modern
approaches to CSR which China and the United States have taken, and
discusses the benefits of adopting a voluntary model of CSR in the future.
Although dissatisfaction with corporate activity is not a new occurrence,
neither the piecemeal American approach nor the top-down Chinese
approach seems to have resulted in more socially responsible corporations.
Therefore, this Note argues that government-instituted CSR, both legislative
and regulatory, is ineffective and should be discontinued.
Instead,
corporations should be at liberty to choose whether or not to engage in
socially responsible behavior as part of their general business plan.
Part II of this Note presents a general overview of the history and
development of CSR, its origins, and the objectives it was intended to
achieve. Part III describes CSR efforts in China. This Note takes a holistic
perspective in exploring not only the legal foundation of CSR, but also the
historical and social underpinnings for CSR as well. Part IV mirrors Part III
in discussing the evolution of CSR in the United States, including legal
initiatives and the socio-historic and philosophical bases for CSR. Part V
draws a comparison between the two countries’ respective approaches to
CSR and offers an analysis of effective CSR implementation efforts in each.
Part VI applies the inferences drawn in Part V to current and future CSR
initiatives and expands on the argument for minimizing government
involvement in CSR and the advancement of corporate freedom. Finally,
Part VII concludes this Note.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: ORIGINS
AND GOALS
The most basic legal issue underlying CSR is whether corporate directors
owe a legal duty to take into consideration the effects of their decisions only
on shareholders or on all stakeholders affected by the corporations’ actions.10
General principles of corporate social responsibility have been in existence
for as long as businesses have operated.11 In the West, “[t]he bonds of trust
and principles of good faith and fair dealing used by medieval merchants,
guilds, and bodies corporate in the medieval lex mercatoria (“law of
merchant”) reflected that cooperative and beneficial public purpose and
sense of mutual responsibility.”12
Principles of corporate social
responsibility were also a fundamental part of business practice in colonial
America:
Public purposes certainly characterized the companies
chartered by the early American states . . . . [T]he state
generally reserved to itself the power to determine what kinds
of entity it would permit to come into existence, vetting both
the identity of the promoters and the nature of the venture.
Corporate social responsibility was thus encoded into the DNA
of the firm, since the firm could not come into existence unless
it could withstand a valid public purpose test.13
The extreme and more contemporary rule asserting the concept of
shareholder primacy was set forth in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.14 There, the
court endorsed the view that corporations are run solely for the benefit of
shareholders:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
10

C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002).
11
Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 334, 343 (2009) (“Today’s corporations derive from ancient
predecessors and have a long pedigree as instruments for collective social purpose, with CSR
‘in their DNA.’ ”).
12
Id. at 344.
13
Id.
14
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders
in order to devote them to other purposes.15
In its rejection of stakeholder benefit trumping maximization of profit,
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. represents the “high (or low!) water mark of
[corporate social responsibility] doctrine.”16 In fact, “[a]side from Dodge,
there are no other cases that ‘actually operationalize the rule that
corporations must maximize profits.’ ”17 Thus, Dodge stands alone in its
position that corporate activity should be undertaken to benefit stakeholders.
In the years following the Dodge decision, legal scholars fiercely debated
the issues it addressed.18 One of the earliest concise definitions of what is
now known as corporate social responsibility was articulated during this era
when Professor E. Merrick Dodd wrote, “those who manage our business
corporations should concern themselves with the interests of employees,
consumers, and the general public, as well as of the stockholders.”19
The intellectual tug-of-war between the proponents of shareholder and
stakeholder-primacy models did not end in the first half of the twentieth
century, however. In the latter half of the century, Professor Milton
Friedman rejected the developing CSR doctrine set forth by Professor Dodd
and his intellectual descendants, instead advocating for a shareholderprimacy approach that elevated corporate profits above charitable giving and
other activities deemed incompatible with profitmaking.20 Disdaining the
CSR initiatives he conceptualized as “window-dressing,” Professor Friedman
further argued that “ ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.’ ”21
15

Id. at 684.
MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA & CHIP PITTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 62 (Chip Pitts ed., 2009).
17
Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the
Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 643 n.70 (2009) (quoting Jonathan Macey, A
Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 180
(2008)).
18
Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1931) (arguing that corporate managers owe a fiduciary duty exclusively to the benefit
of shareholders), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (arguing that a broader characterization of corporate duty
should include other stakeholders).
19
Dodd, supra note 18, at 1156.
20
Friedman, supra note 5.
21
Id.
16
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Present day proponents of Professor Friedman’s theories similarly
characterize CSR efforts as little more than good advertising.22
On the other end of the ideological spectrum, Professor R. Edward
Freeman advocated for a “strategic management” model that incorporated
CSR principles into a comprehensive stakeholder-centric corporate
governance scheme.23 Ethical considerations, he argued, are central to a
corporate strategy that embraces corporate social responsibility.24 Professor
Freeman’s portrayal of corporations as moral entities who must take their
ethical responsibilities seriously is not obscure. His perspective is consistent
with those of other scholars, who argue that “as actors in this world with both
positive and negative impacts, corporations are best seen not as inherently
immoral or moral but as collections of human beings who act together as
agents with moral consequences—for good or ill.”25 Corporate social
responsibility therefore exceeds standard laws and regulations and appeals to
a more fundamental idea of right and wrong in the context of corporate
behavior.26
On a global scale, more recent CSR initiatives have been characterized as
a response to the “trade liberalization era of the 1990s,” when world-wide
corporate activity became more commonplace due to tremendous advances
in technology.27 Moreover, modern CSR represents the confluence of
voluntary corporate efforts and the broader, governmental and
supragovernmental regulatory schemes.28 Indeed, the nexus between public
and private action leaves open to debate whether even voluntary CSR efforts
are truly voluntary or just a response to government action.29 Some scholars
have observed that “although state policies stand as constraints on
supragovernmental ones, they work more as influences than as controls.”30
22

Andrew C. Coors & Wayne Winegarden, Corporate Social Responsibility—Or Good
Advertising?, REGULATION, Spring 2005, at 10, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulati
on/regv28n1/v28n1-noted.pdf.
23
R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 246–47
(1984).
24
R. EDWARD FREEMAN & DANIEL R. GILBERT, JR., CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE SEARCH
FOR ETHICS 174–75 (1988).
25
KERR, JANDA & PITTS, supra note 16, at 40–41.
26
Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural
Change?, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 64, 64 (2010) (“[CSR] suggests that companies should do
more than they are obligated under applicable laws . . . .”); see also FREEMAN & GILBERT,
supra note 24, at 5 (“Ethics and business go together.”).
27
Pitts, supra note 11, at 357.
28
Id. at 359.
29
Id.
30
Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be
Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 513, 528 (2008).
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Lastly, modern CSR is seen as a response to “unbridled [corporate]
control [that] was exacerbating social inequalities and human rights
violations while endangering the earth’s ecological systems and depleting
natural resources.”31 CSR’s goals, therefore, are the betterment of mankind,
society, and the environment in order to achieve a more peaceful world.32
III. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA
A. Legislative Action
1. Legislation
On January 1, 2006 the most recent version of China’s Company Law
became effective.33 This major piece of legislation provided the foundation
for China’s “strong and mandatory, compliance and impact-oriented public
action” implementation of corporate social responsibility.34 Its text, which
mandates that companies “shall comply with the laws and administrative
regulations, social morality and business morality” and “shall act in good
faith, accept the supervision of the government and the general public, and
bear social responsibilities,”35 codifies the obligation of businesses
nationwide to observe the basic principles of CSR and provides a legal basis
for corporate social responsibility in China.
The law is the product of much deliberation among both Chinese legal
scholars and the National People’s Congress delegates who drafted the
revision.36 As an amalgamation of views, Article 5 is subject to multiple
interpretations.37 The predominant view is that Article 5 functions not as a
fiat but as an exhortation.38 Alternatively, some scholars argue that corporate
31
Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 51 (2010).
32
See Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591,
611–12 (2008) (providing definitions used by various governments and NGOs for the term
“corporate social responsibility”).
33
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Chinese Company
Law], available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=50878.
34
Joëlle Brohier-Meuter, The Rise of CSR Public Policy in Asia: The Case of Southeast
Asia and China, in RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT IN ASIA: PERSPECTIVES ON CSR 65, 84
(Geoffrey Williams ed., 2011).
35
Chinese Company Law, supra note 33, art. 5 (emphasis added).
36
Lin, supra note 26, at 70–71.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 96.
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social responsibility is “part of [a business’s] fiduciary duties under the
company law.”39 In either case, the law unequivocally makes the Chinese
government a strong actor in the realm of corporate social responsibility.
In addition to differing perspectives on the actual effect of Article 5, a
pertinent background issue is the acknowledged shortcomings of the
developing Chinese legal system.40 While corporate social responsibility has
technically been enacted, the “ambiguity and unpredictability in rules and
deficiency in implementation [of Chinese law]” make it difficult to assess the
practical status of the law governing CSR.41 Furthermore, the Chinese
government frequently uses temporary trials to test new legislation, making it
difficult to gauge the long-term effectiveness of CSR initiatives that are only
implemented on a short-term basis.42
China’s previous Company Law, enacted in 1994, was less explicit in its
recognition of CSR.43 The fact that contemporary CSR doctrine was not then
fully conceptualized in China partially contributes to the omission of clear
language endorsing corporate social responsibility principles.44 Still, it is
unnecessary to read the law liberally in order to discern the underlying CSR
principles; for example, the textual basis for CSR in the 1994 Company Law
comes from Article 14, which provided that “[c]ompanies must comply with
the law, conform to business ethics, strengthen the construction of the
socialist civilization, and subject themselves to the government and public
supervision in the course of business.”45 However, values now considered
central to CSR, specifically consideration for stakeholders such as
employees, were “institutionalized into the corporate governance structure”
by the 1994 Company Law.46
Other legislative actions in China have contributed to the institutional
adoption of corporate social responsibility in the country. The Harmonious
Society Policy, proposed by President Hu Jintao and adopted by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, has serious implications for

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; see also Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2011 Special 301 Report
19–21 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publication
s/2011/2011-special-301-report (discussing China’s 2010 Special Campaign to Combat
Intellectual Property Infringement).
43
Lin, supra note 26, at 68 (“The 1994 Company Law did not explicitly refer to
CSR. . . .”).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 69.
46
Id. at 68.
40
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corporate social responsibility.47 Specifically, CSR policies are seen as a
broad approach to Chinese governance, which promote the ruling party’s
goals with respect to the economy, social stability, and environmental
protection.48 In a more general sense, the Harmonious Society Policy adopts
the principles of CSR in an effort to promote desired social outcomes—
namely, “[closing] the gap between rural and urban development, unequal
income distribution, insufficiency of household wealth, ecological
degradation and lack of efficient use of resources.”49
2. The Chinese Constitution
In addition to legislation adopting CSR, the basic principles enshrined in
the Chinese constitution tacitly approve CSR.50 At its formation, the
document was intended to promote the rights of workers and guarantee social
benefits.51 Amendments in recent years have even backtracked slightly on
China’s typical aversion to addressing human rights and have begun to
protect certain human rights in the Chinese constitution.52 While many of
China’s major corporations are still state owned enterprises (SOEs)
controlled by the government (nearly a quarter of corporate assets are state-

47
Sixth General Meeting of the Sixteenth Central Commission of the Chinese Communist
Party, Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Ruogan Zhongda
Wenti de Jueding [Several Important Resolutions on the Construction of Socialist Harmonious
Society by the Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Party], Oct. 11, 2006,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm; see also
China Publishes Resolution on Building of Harmonious Society, XINHUA, Oct. 18, 2006,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/18/content_5219111.htm; Maureen Fan, China’s
Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’ Doctrine Proposed By
President Hu Formally Endorsed, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18.
48
Brohier-Meuter, supra note 34, at 70.
49
Id.
50
See XIANFA (1982) (China).
51
Id. art. 1; see also Lin, supra note 26, at 68 (“The Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China states that the country is led by the proletariat and is based on the alliance of workers
and peasants.”).
52
See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 180, 193 (2003) (quoting the Chief Justice of the Chinese Supreme Court:
“[T]he Constitution is the expression of the people’s power and the citizens’ rights.”).
However, these new guarantees of freedom have negligible practical effects because the
protections are not enforced by the Chinese legislature or judiciary organs and in fact are
effectively destroyed through other government activities. See, e.g., Jianlan Zhu, Roadblock
and Roadmap: Circumventing Press Censorship in China in the New Media Dimension, 30 U.
LA VERNE L. REV. 404, 406 (2009) (discussing the contradiction between the Chinese
constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press and low level press regulations).
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owned),53 the constitution does now recognize and approve the existence of
private sectors of the economy.54 Thus, the general underlying principles of
the Chinese constitution seem to implicitly further some of the same goals
incorporated by corporate social responsibility.
3. Other Enactments and Methods of Implementation
A multitude of other laws and regulatory enactments have been adopted
to implement corporate social responsibility, including the Labour Contract
Law, the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, and the
Measures on Open Environmental Information.55 Such initiatives are
consistent with the defining characteristic of Chinese CSR efforts: top-down
planning that incorporates a diverse array of regulatory methods.56 The
Chinese government primarily exercises power over CSR development
through “(1) Company law including CSR; (2) CSR guidelines—even if
these guidelines do not have the status of law, we can assume that they have
regulatory power; [and] (3) [e]nvironmental requirements for credit and
listing in stock exchange.”57 Other methods include quasi-judicial CSR
Guidelines disseminated by public actors58 and policy statements
encouraging traditional components of CSR, such as sustainable
development, issued by the Chinese government.59 Examples of the
aforementioned methods of CSR-regulation in China are numerous.60 Actors
releasing CSR legislation, recommendations, guidelines, and regulations
include the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
of the State Council (SASAC), the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of
Commerce, the State Forestry Administration, the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC), the Ministry of Environmental Protection, stock
exchanges, and provincial and municipal governments.61 These public actors
have instituted everything from reporting requirements to the China Charity
53
NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, COMMUNIQUE ON MAJOR DATA OF THE SECOND
NATIONAL ECONOMIC CENSUS (NO. 1) (2009), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcoming
events/t20091225_402610168.htm (stating that of 186,300 billion Yuan in corporate assets,
47,700 billion Yuan are state-owned).
54
XIANFA art. 11 (amended 2004) (“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the
non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the
economy.”).
55
Brohier-Meuter, supra note 34, at 75.
56
Id. at 76.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 84.
59
Lin, supra note 26, at 88.
60
See Brohier-Meuter, supra note 34, tbl.4.6 (listing public CSR initiatives in China).
61
Id.
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Awards, which present awards to both local and overseas enterprises for their
financial donations.62
B. Scope, Limits, and Enforcement
While Chinese corporate social responsibility efforts have undergone an
incredible expansion in recent years, some sectors are still neglected. For
example, China still tends to exclude human rights from its conception of
CSR and instead focuses on environmental and labor issues.63 Traditionally,
the Chinese government dominated CSR and severely limited the role of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).64 Thus, only recently have NGOs
begun to impact CSR in China.
China has taken a strong-handed approach to enforcement of its CSR
initiatives. Violations of CSR mandates can result in fines, prison sentences,
and even execution of responsible corporate officers.65 Such harsh penalties
may or may not be effective, however, because enforcement is often uneven
and there are discrepancies “between the law on the books and the law in
practice,” with many of the mandatory CSR initiatives going largely
unenforced.66
C. Societal Basis
1. Socio-Historic Basis
Chinese corporate social responsibility is strongly influenced by the
historical role of state-owned enterprises as providers of “cradle-to-grave”
social services and programs instituted by the socialist government.67 The
evolution of the Chinese Company Law has struggled to synthesize a more
capitalistic model where the goal is maximizing profits while simultaneously
retaining a sense of corporate responsibility towards workers and
unrepresented parties affected by a corporation’s decisions.68 Corporate
social responsibility is a partial solution to the systemic transition problems

62

Id. at 77.
Id. at 77–80.
64
Id. at 90.
65
Id. at 81.
66
Lin, supra note 26, at 96.
67
Xinting Jia, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Past,
Present, and Future, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 136 (2004).
68
Id.; see also Lin, supra note 26, at 90–91.
63
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facing the Chinese government and its SOEs.69 Certain CSR initiatives,
particularly those that benefit employees, may help reduce worker unrest as
traditional social programs administering benefits to workers are
discontinued by SOEs.70
2. Religious-Philosophical Basis
The philosophical underpinnings of Chinese society complement the
values of corporate social responsibility, providing a strong societal
foundation for CSR in China. Two primary Chinese traditions relate to CSR.
First, in traditional Chinese culture, which is heavily influenced by
Confucianism, profit-seeking is spurned in favor of the company’s “inherent
social responsibilities.”71 Historically, business entities run by extended
families were viewed as “an organic part of the larger community” with
responsibilities toward stakeholders in the community as well as the entire
country.72 Thus, Confucian philosophy’s hostility toward profit-making
complements Chinese societal understanding of corporate social
responsibility.73
Second, the Buddhist tradition in China has many parallels with corporate
social responsibility. For example, Zen philosophy tends to encourage
“values, norms and rules that shape the responsible business behaviour.”74
[T]he East and South has been more content with innerdirected, intangible CSR (deeply rooted in cultural, tribal or
religious traditions of community, respect and reciprocity).
Examples include . . . the Chinese notion of xiaokang
(‘harmonious society’).
The Zen of CSR also suggests that CSR has transformative
power–that both companies and individuals can be changed by

69

Jia, supra note 67 (“[S]ince China is still in its transition period of economic reform, it is
inevitable that former [CSR-esque worker support programs] will . . . provide a stable
environment for economic development.”).
70
Lin, supra note 26, at 88.
71
Id. at 85.
72
Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2000).
73
Id. at 1607 (“The main problem for Chinese business enterprises was the anti-mercantile
attitude of orthodox Confucianism and its general ideological hostility to profit-seeking.”).
74
Wayne Visser, Zen, in THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 501, 501
(Wayne Visser et al. eds., 2007).
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engaging with CSR, which points to . . . CSR as a form of selftranscendence.75
Additionally, scholarly studies of the influence of major world religions on
business ethics have also noted a correlation between Buddhism and socially
responsible corporate practices.76 Some scholars view CSR as a material
aspect of Buddhism: “[I]n the economic field many Buddhist teachers argue
that detachment from the purely material and a focus on social and
environmental responsibility in production, distribution and exchange are
consistent with and indeed central to the proper practice of the faith.”77
Particular aspects of CSR, especially environmental protection efforts, are
very closely associated with Buddhist values, which “stem from the
recognition of mutual interdependence of all things and the desire to avoid
doing harm to any living thing.”78 More generally, Buddhists express “a
clear preference for ethical business behaviour compared to non-believers.”79
Thus, closely held Chinese philosophy and religious traditions provide a
solid foundation in Chinese society for the adoption of corporate social
responsibility.
Finally, various socio-political issues have encouraged the development
of CSR. Perhaps because SOEs were unaccustomed to authentic public
accountability, responsible corporate behavior did not develop naturally
among Chinese companies as the Chinese economy moved toward a market
system where profit-making was encouraged.80 In recent years, current
events, such as the tainted infant formula scandal,81 caused popular outrage
and emboldened Chinese citizens to insist on increasing corporate
accountability and social responsibility.82 Failure to address perceived

75

Id. at 502.
Stephen Brammer et al., Religion and Attitudes to Corporate Social Responsibility in a
Large Cross-Country Sample, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 229 (2006).
77
Id. at 232.
78
Id. at 233.
79
Id. at 235.
80
See Lin, supra note 26, at 90 (noting that some scholars posit that the sense of corporate
irresponsibility embodied by some Chinese companies stems from “the political ambience in
the initial stage of economic development”).
81
Ying Chen, Corporate Social Responsibility from the Chinese Perspective, 21 IND. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 419, 419 (2011).
82
See Jim Yardley, Chinese Baby Formula Scandal Widens as 2nd Death is Announced,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A6 (pointing out how, since the formula scandal, Chinese
regulators have become more determined to crack down on company cover-ups and failures to
announce defects in a timely manner).
76

760

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:747

environmental and economic shortcomings has prompted indignation among
Chinese citizens dissatisfied with insufficient CSR practices.83
Other factors, such as poor working conditions and inadequate CSRinfluenced labor laws, also contribute to social ire.84 Additionally,
marginalization of underrepresented groups and the Communist Party’s
focus on “boosting public ‘happiness’ rather than just GDP” has contributed
to a stronger push towards implementation of effective CSR measures.85
Placing a strong emphasis on social harmony is particularly imperative
for Chinese officials because “[g]ood performance in improving living
quality of the Chinese population is believed to be the most important pillar
of the [Chinese Communist Party’s] political legitimacy.”86 Propaganda is
regularly distributed in an effort to publicize and praise the Communist
Party’s supposed successes in improving social conditions and welfare.87
Successful implementation of corporate social responsibility policies that
promote social harmony and stability is therefore a key objective of the
Chinese government. Absent a successful transition to a market economy—
wherein the expected social programs historically administered by SOEs are
protected and the worker’s influence as stakeholder is preserved—the
Communist Party could potentially face intense scrutiny, in turn undermining
its presently unchallenged rule.88 Thus, corporate social responsibility in
China is rightfully characterized as a mechanism for social and political
stability in an evolving economic system.
83

Lin, supra note 26, at 91.
Id. at 92 (“Chinese workers have voiced their anger through their exodus from
sweatshops.”).
85
Rising Power, Anxious State, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2011, at 3, 18.
86
Lin, supra note 26, at 93; see also JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: THE
POLITICS OF TRANSITION 9 (William Kirby ed., 2001) (noting the huge reform shift “from class
struggle to economic modernization,” and the importance of performance legitimacy and the
ways in which the Chinese political system can respond).
87
See, e.g., Ma Zuyun, Communist Party of China as [sic] Earned Right to Lead, PEOPLE’S
DAILY, June 23, 2011, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/74189
38.html (praising the Communist Party’s success in adapting to fluctuating world conditions
and remaining a leader of China’s revolution); Zhong Jia, CPC Makes People Proud,
PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 24, 2011, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/7420
264.html (attributing Communist Party’s ability to “save” China to always remembering its
Chinese roots); and Li Xiaosan, Chinese Can Derive Strength from Party History, PEOPLE’S
DAILY, June 24, 2011, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/7419275.html
(stating the history of the Communist Party is congruent with “the inspired history of the
Chinese revolution, the unyielding history of Chinese construction, and the magnificent
history of Chinese reform”).
88
See Jia, supra note 67 (describing China’s gradual corporate change); see also Lin, supra
note 26, at 88 (“How to properly settle the . . . employees without causing social unrest has
been an important question. In the transitional period, balancing the interests of stakeholders
in the SOEs is an important task, which therefore echoes some aspects of CSR.”).
84
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IV. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Legislative Action
1. Model Codes and State Legislation
Corporate social responsibility initiatives in the United States have been
codified selectively, although the level of government that addresses CSR
tends to have implications on how explicitly CSR principles are expressed.
Model codes, state law, and federal statutes each take a different approach to
the codification of CSR.
At the bottom of the statutory hierarchy, model codes take a moderate
approach in implementing CSR. For example, the American Law Institute
(ALI) expresses a permissive view towards CSR in its Principles of
Corporate Governance.89 Under the ALI model statute, corporate directors
are allowed to make decisions with ethical or humanitarian purposes in mind
and may “devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare and
philanthropic purposes, even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not
enhanced.”90 Such actions are neither banned nor mandated.91
States largely take a similar approach as the Principles of Corporate
Governance.92 Simply put, state “[c]orporate law neither statutorily imposes
a duty to maximize profits nor mandates profit maximization as the sole
purpose of the corporation.”93 In Pennsylvania, for example, corporate
directors are permitted to “consider . . . [t]he effects of any action upon any
or all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees,
suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities
in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located.”94
Pennsylvania’s statute represents the permissive approach because it gives
directors the freedom to make unprofitable decisions, thus preserving the
fundamental principle of corporate law, the business judgment rule.95
89

See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1992) (allowing a corporation’s objective
to focus on profit).
90
Choudhury, supra note 17, at 643.
91
PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 89.
92
See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2012) (giving deference to management).
93
Choudhury, supra note 17, at 640.
94
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2012).
95
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize
corporate profits. Rather, they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to
sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest . . . . [T]he implicit version of this discretion
could not be eliminated without destroying the business judgment rule that is the bedrock of
corporate law.”).
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Delaware case law also reflects this permissive approach.96 The
permissive statutory approach, giving directors the discretion to make
business decisions in the interests of corporate social responsibility rather
than in the pursuit of profits, is firmly established in the United States. No
state places the onus of pure profit-maximization on directors, but all have
enacted statutes allowing directors to make “unprofitable corporate
donations.”97
Equitable rules also play a role in CSR implementation.98 For example,
Professor Adolf Berle suggested what would effectively be a broad
expansion of the fiduciary duty of directors enforced by courts of equity.99
This approach characterized directors as holding the assets of the corporation
in trust for the shareholders.100 Unlike typical legislative or regulatory
approaches, Professor Berle’s theory envisions that the activities of directors
would be subject to review by courts of equity which would “impose strict
duties on corporate managers.”101 Despite Professor Berle’s influence on the
debate over CSR, his theory in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust has
gained little traction and is not widely accepted.102
2. Federal Forays into CSR
Corporate social responsibility was initially seen as a state matter, and
states traditionally have had jurisdiction over business and commercial law.
In the twenty-first century however, the federal government has not been
silent with regards to CSR legislation and policy.103 Historically, states were
tasked with authority over corporate governance and the federal government
maintained power to regulate securities,104 but “the relative powers of the

96
See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990);
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (construing
Delaware law “to authorize any reasonable corporate gift of a charitable or educational
nature”).
97
Elhauge, supra note 95, at 738.
98
Wells, supra note 10, at 89.
99
Id. at 88–89.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 90.
102
Id. at 90–91.
103
Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the United
States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
149, 150, 167 (2009).
104
Id. at 167–76 (describing the creation of federal power to regulate securities through the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and creation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission).
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federal government and the states have shifted over the last seventy-five
years, particularly in response to corporate crises and scandals.”105
For example, Congress tentatively approached federal CSR legislation in
the wake of the Enron scandal when skepticism toward corporate actors
reached a fever pitch.106 One interpretation of the fall of Enron theorizes that
“Enron’s business model exemplifies the pathology of the ‘shareholder
value’ system . . . . The company’s focus on short-term stock price
appreciation, in part the result of the share options granted to senior
management, was the cause of its downfall.”107 In other words, the profitmaximization model, which Enron took to the extreme, encourages
irresponsible decision-making and causes companies to make short-term
decisions with negative long-term consequences.108 The solution, according
to some scholars, is to return discretion to directors who can then take both
short-term profit and long-term corporate well-being and responsibility into
account.109
In response to the collapse of Enron and a series of related corporate
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which sought to preclude
Enron-style events from occurring in the future.110 Although Sarbanes-Oxley
105

Id. at 176.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (2002); see also Five Years Under the
Thumb: Corporate America Is Learning How to Live with the Tough Regulations Introduced
After the Collapse of Enron, ECONOMIST, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/9545905?story_id=9545905 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, widely known as SOX,
was signed into law on July 30th 2002 by George Bush, who called its tough new rules the
‘most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since Franklin Roosevelt was
president’. The hope was to restore public confidence in American business, which had been
badly shaken by huge corporate scandals, such as those which led to the bankruptcies of
Enron and WorldCom.”).
107
Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age of
Enlightenment?, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING
SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 156 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery
eds., 2006).
108
Id.; see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C.
L. REV. 829, 844 (2004) (“[C]orporate managers engaged in behavior that resulted in a
deceptive portrayal of the corporation’s financial state. The behavior presumably was
motivated by the actors’ belief that this portrayal would positively affect the market worth of
the corporation in question . . . .”).
109
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (“The only effective
antidotes to fraud are active and vigilant markets and professionals with strong incentives to
investigate corporate managers and dig up corporate information.”).
110
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (2002); Thomas Schneck, The Duty to
Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 703 (2005) (stating that “[i]n response to
professional studied ignorance, as well as even more serious issues brought to light in Enron
and Worldcom, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires higher
standards of professional responsibility for lawyers practicing before the SEC, as well as
106
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is not explicit CSR legislation, the Act’s underlying rationale correlates
strongly with corporate social responsibility.111 In fact, some scholars
recognized the opportunity Sarbanes-Oxley created to incorporate CSR into
federal law:
As we contemplate the integrity of corporate accounting
statements [explicitly addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley], we can
continue to contemplate the fairness of corporate
actions. . . . [I]t may appear that strategies for assuring that
corporate managers neither lie about nor steal corporate assets
also are helpful in preserving the environment, improving the
lives of workers, and enhancing product quality.112
Federal securities laws, which preceded Sarbanes-Oxley, are another area of
federal regulation of corporate behavior.113 Actions taken by the Securities
Exchange Commission, including the promulgation of the Shareholder
Proposal Rule and insider trading restrictions, along with Congressional acts
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are examples of federal forays into
corporate governance and practices.114 Again, while these laws do not
explicitly mandate CSR, they do lay a foundation for more federal
involvement in the CSR behavior of corporations.115
B. Scope and Enforcement
Corporate social responsibility in the United States incorporates a number
of diverse interests.116 The activities involved in CSR historically were “seen
as mainly ‘donations to social and artistic causes and other such acts of
corporate philanthropy.’ ”117 In relation to those affected by the corporation,
requiring officers of public corporations to personally certify the accuracy of certain
documents submitted to the SEC upon which third parties customarily rely”).
111
See Ribstein, supra note 109, at 11–18 (discussing key reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley and
similar regulations that attempt to allow the federal government to indirectly regulate
corporate governance).
112
Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 830.
113
Id. at 841.
114
Letsou, supra note 103, at 179–91.
115
See id. (noting that although Congress and the SEC have taken steps at the federal level
to encourage or mandate changes in corporate governance practices, these steps tend to be
“more modest reforms, rather than wholesale displacements of state corporate law”).
116
Backer, supra note 32.
117
Pitts, supra note 11, at 389 (quoting Abid Aslam, Backgrounder: Corporate Social
Responsibility, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE (2007), http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/
j_corporatesocial.html).
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CSR in the United States also seeks to define the “duties large business
organizations might have to their workers, customers, neighbors, and the
public at large.”118 Ultimately, American CSR attempts to motivate
“corporate managers and directors to take into account the needs not only of
shareholders but of workers, consumers, and communities when making
business decisions.”119
C. Social Basis
The social basis for CSR in the United States is broad and diverse. From
a moral-humanist perspective, corporations often use cooperation with CSR
policies to appear virtuous and to relate to their communities.120 However,
some religious groups—particularly those of the Abrahamic tradition—tend
to view socially responsible corporate behavior as a tenet of their faith.121
Codes of conduct promulgated by religious groups promote values common
to CSR, such as justice, mutual respect, stewardship, and honesty.122
Historical factors may also contribute to the social acceptance of
corporate social responsibility. For instance, some scholars posit that CSR
developed as a response to the perceived irresponsibility of corporations in
the years preceding the Great Depression.123 Others suggest later social
movements contributed more to the adoption of CSR.124
Socio-political traditions in the United States may also explain an affinity
towards CSR doctrine.125 In the United States, businesses have typically
been given the freedom to engage in economic activity subject to the
118

Wells, supra note 10, at 77.
Id. at 79.
120
Colin Marks & Paul S. Miller, Plato, The Prince, and Corporate Virtue: Philosophical
Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2010).
121
See, e.g., AN INTERFAITH DECLARATION: A CODE OF ETHICS ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
FOR CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND JEWS (Nov. 30, 1992), available at http://institute.jesdialogue.
org/fileadmin/bizcourse/INTERFAITHDECLARATION.pdf (stating that a dialogue between
a group of Christian, Jewish and Muslim thinkers and business leaders led to the drafting of a
Declaration of International Business Ethics which focused on supplanting the emerging value
system of dishonesty and selfishness with one of integrity and generosity).
122
Kelly Lavelle, Interfaith Declaration: A Code of Ethics on International Business for
Christians, Muslims and Jews, in THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 279, 280
(Wayne Visser et al. eds., 2007).
123
See Wells, supra note 10, for a more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the
Berle-Means debate during the Depression Era.
124
FREEMAN & GILBERT, supra note 24, at 88 (“Rooted in the post-World War II social
environment, particularly the social movements in the 1960’s, models of corporate social
responsibility were developed to enable managers to understand the societal obligations
incurred by their firms.”).
125
Id.
119
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government’s supervision and oversight.126 Professor Freeman observed
that, “[t]he business-government relationship in the U.S. has been founded
on the principles of the ‘watch-dog,’ i.e., it is the legitimate role of
government to regulate business in the public interest, and to enforce strict
anti-trust laws to insure adherence to market principles.”127 Such an attitude
is consistent with CSR’s blend of corporate and political action.
V. COMPARING THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
There are multiple points of comparison and contrast between CSR in the
United States and CSR in China. One of the obvious differences between the
two approaches is the federal nature of CSR legislation. In China, as
previously discussed, the governing Company Law is a law of nationwide
impact, enacted and enforced by the national government of the People’s
Republic of China.128 In contrast, the federal government in the United
States has been less active in regulating corporate activity in this country.129
Such nationwide legislation in China is arguably more enforceable, at
least on a statutory basis, than legislation implemented by individual U.S.
states. Whereas China’s Company Law sets forth unambiguous and
mandatory language implementing CSR, state statutes in the U.S. generally
take a permissive approach and do not contain affirmative language similar
to the Chinese statute.130 This may be due to the fact that China has taken a
top-down approach to CSR implementation, which fits naturally with its
communist scheme of governance. The United States, on the other hand, has
likewise taken the approach natural to its federalist bottom-up government:
selective state implementation followed by federal encroachment on
corporate social responsibility issues.
The obvious conclusion—that textual differences in the respective
statutes mean China’s statute is better implemented, must be taken with a
caveat. In practice, it is unlikely the Chinese statute allows for more
effective enforcement of CSR than U.S. statutes do because of the general
ambiguity and uneven enforcement that plagues Chinese law. Thus, neither
country has truly established a mechanism to effectively mandate, enforce,
and oversee the implementation of corporate social responsibility.

126

FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 13.
Id.
128
Chinese Company Law, supra note 33.
129
Wells, supra note 10, at 118–23 (discussing how failure of federal chartering means state
law primarily governs corporations).
130
Compare Chinese Company Law, supra note 33, with 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2012).
127

2013]

THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS

767

Another difference between CSR in the U.S. and China is the motivation
behind its propagation. In the United States, CSR is seen as a moral
obligation of companies, properly overseen by the government, which
improves the relationship between the corporation and individuals. On the
other hand, CSR in China is a means to an end—namely the maintenance of
the regime’s political stability and firm hold on power in China. The
contrasting motives the United States and China have for adopting CSR may
be partially explained by the countries’ different sources of political
legitimacy—representative government in the United States and communist
government in China—but this topic is outside the scope of this Note.
On a related note, Chinese CSR has focused more on corporate social
responsibility initiatives that further ideals acceptable to the Communist
Party of China. Often, these include environmental objectives and more
protective labor standards rather than protection for human rights or civil
liberties.131 Unlike China, which limits the scope of CSR, corporate social
responsibility in the United States is much broader and more inclusive of
everything from traditional charitable giving to ensuring corporations
comply with established human rights standards in the pursuit of profit.132 It
is difficult to say which approach is more objectively effective because there
are numerous methods of measuring the effectiveness of CSR.133
The underlying commonality between the respective approaches of China
and the United States is the apparent presumption that the government
necessarily must become involved in the development and implementation of
CSR initiatives. Admittedly, both have taken slightly different approaches
and have enacted different gradations of CSR at various levels of
government.
Fundamentally, though, both still rely on government
regulations to compel positive behavior by corporations.
VI. THE FUTURE OF CSR
A. Proposals Suggesting Further Government Intervention
A number of proposals support increased government involvement in
CSR and corporate conscience activities and regulations. Government
regulation is seen as a necessary solution to the perceived problems of

131

Lin, supra note 26, at 74–75.
Pitts, supra note 11, at 337–39.
133
Different methods of measuring CSR include public opinion regarding corporations, the
absolute value of donations and corporate giving, and the percentage of corporate earnings
directed towards charity. It is even more difficult to measure the value of non-monetary gifts.
132
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corporate indifference or unwillingness to engage in socially responsible
activity.134
1. Corporate Conscience Committees
The first major proposal is the government-mandated establishment of
corporate conscience committees.135 According to proponents, conscience
committees would be given the task of ensuring the corporation was
undertaking appropriate CSR initiatives; such efforts are quaintly
characterized as a corporate Jiminy Cricket.136
This proposal has several insurmountable obstacles. Most fundamentally,
the creation of corporate conscience committees would do little more than
provide additional procedures for corporations to comply with while failing
to ensure an objectively effective outcome.137 The inherently advisory nature
of conscience committees would place the duty to produce recommendations
on a few, while removing responsibility from other entities within the
corporation who logically should share the burden of implementing social
responsibility.138 From an “outsider” perspective, such “[a] proposal that
does no more than ritually invoke the services of the same group of middleaged white male and white male wannabes is . . . apt to fall prey to the
criticism that it is a counterproductive standard operating procedure,” and
fails to take into account diverse perspectives on social responsibility.139
Finally, it is unclear how the government would oversee the establishment of
conscience committees.140
2. Stringent SEC Monitoring
A related proposal suggests additional monitoring and disclosure
requirements by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).141
Proponents argue that the SEC has the authority to “require disclosure of
socially relevant, but non-material, information,” and presupposes that

134

Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 829–34 (noting “the intervention of conscience is
necessary” and detailing several government-initiated proposals).
135
Id. at 863.
136
Id. at 858–59.
137
Id. at 859.
138
Id. at 861.
139
Id. at 864.
140
Id. at 863–64.
141
Wells, supra note 10, at 134–35.
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forcing companies to disclose their activities will cause them to engage in
more CSR behavior.142
Increased disclosure mandated by the SEC, however, suffers from the
same process-related problems of the preceding proposals. Simply ordering
companies to disclose their inner-workings will not necessarily incentivize
them to engage in CSR; but even supposing it did, disclosure requirements
give negligible direction toward the types of programs proponents assume
will be adopted.143
3. Criminal Penalties
The third proposal, which addresses the enforcement shortcomings
inherent in the abovementioned proposals, would resort to an alternative
method of government regulation: criminal enforcement for corporate
indifference.144 Such a penal approach would undoubtedly increase the
incentive for corporate officers and directors to engage in more socially
responsible behavior.145 Unlike the proposals grounded in process, however,
it could also result in corporate flight to jurisdictions that do not have
criminal enforcement for failure to implement CSR.146 Criminalizing the
failure to act also dredges up the controversial and long-standing debate over
the legal liability for nonfeasance or omissions rather than malfeasance or
positive wrong-doing.147
Finally, the potential for criminal liability
complicates the relationship between the corporation and its managers as the
parties seek to manage risk.148
Another potential drawback is the tendency of government enforcement
mechanisms to become even more draconian.149 Faced with avoidance or
142
Id. For a detailed discussion of the SEC’s ability to implement CSR-type disclosure
requirements, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
143
Wells, supra note 10, at 136.
144
Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 864.
145
Id. at 867.
146
Id.
147
See Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 386–87
(1998) (noting criminal enforcement of omissions is a “controversial and an emotional issue”
that has been debated for almost a century).
148
See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Politics and Corporate Crime Legislation, REGULATION,
Spring 2004, at 33, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulatio
n/2004/4/v27n1-3.pdf (observing the difficulties companies face in trying to indemnify
potential high-level employees against criminal liability, in contrast to the ease of
indemnification for civil liability).
149
See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, A Closer Look at the Federalization Snowball, 109
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 73 (2009).
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noncompliance, government regulation must become even more adept at
delving into the inner workings of corporations and overseeing minute
operating details to ensure compliance with CSR policies and regulations.
The backlash against such measures is demonstrated by business leaders’
dissatisfaction with the oversight provisions contained in Sarbanes-Oxley.150
While businesses must operate under the rule of law, eventually regulations
become so onerous to business that the enforcement costs outweigh any
positive aspects.151 Obviously, corporations should be punished by law for
engaging in fraud or other illegal activities. At some point however,
business decisions must be left to management without the presence of a
government regulator supervising their every move.
Proposals recommending increased government involvement in CSR
issues have fatal flaws that cannot be overcome due to the aforementioned
inherent enforcement problems and dilemmas regarding government
oversight and deference to the business judgment of the corporation’s
leadership. A model that is independent of ineffective government
regulation—but still promotes the positive goals of CSR—is therefore
needed.
B. The Feasible Solution: Corporate-Led CSR
The most effective model for the future of CSR is a corporation-led,
market-oriented, consumer-driven corporate social responsibility doctrine.
This proposal does not suffer from the same weaknesses of governmentinitiative proposals; in fact, its strengths mirror the weaknesses of the other
proposals. One author sums up the argument this way:
Ironically, businesses are probably the best solution that we
can have to the challenges that face us as a society, because
they are the ones that can innovate, can produce solutions, and
can be part of the engine of development that will eventually
bring developing countries out of poverty that may, just may,
have a whisker of a chance of achieving sustainability.152
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Gabaldon, supra note 108, at 854.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Taken to the Cleaners: A Case Study of the Overregulation of
American Small Business, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 200 (Dec. 22, 1993), http://www.cato.
org/pubs/pas/pa200.pdf.
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Don Mayer, Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a More
Peaceful Planet, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 237, 286 (2007).
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Indeed, corporations themselves, not governments, have the strongest
incentive to create partnerships with their communities, cultivate good
relations with stakeholders, and promote well-being because neglecting to do
so will result in diminished revenue or even business failure. Successful
corporations, such as Starbucks, recognize this fact.153 For example, that
company’s CEO, Howard Schultz, recently said, “We can’t wait for
Washington. Business leaders have to step up and do our part.”154
Businesses and other private actors are capable of affecting appropriate CSR
activities.155 Market forces provide the necessary incentive for corporations
and private actors to essentially regulate themselves.156 Indeed, “[c]ivil
regulation theory proposes that businesses are being regulated by civil
society (rather than governments), through the dual effect of negative
impacts from conflict and benefits from collaboration.”157 “[C]ivil society
vigilance, consumer buying power, and socially responsible business
leadership” are also contributing factors to a self-regulation model.158
Other forces also contribute to and facilitate corporate social
responsibility today. For example, modern technology has made a privateactor driven model technologically feasible because consumers and watchdog groups are increasingly able to access information about the corporations
with which they interact.159
The changing nature of corporate giving also dovetails with a
corporation-centric, rather than government-centric, model of CSR.160 One
Wal-Mart Foundation director recently said: “Gone are the days when people
can just put money behind a good idea. We want to support good ideas, but

153
Being a Responsible Company, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
154
Jargon, supra note 2.
155
Id.
156
Milton Friedman, Introduction to LEONARD E. READ, I, PENCIL (1958) (“I know of no
other piece of literature that so succinctly, persuasively, and effectively illustrates the meaning
of both Adam Smith’s invisible hand—the possibility of cooperation without coercion—and
Friedrich Hayek’s emphasis on the importance of dispersed knowledge and the role of the
price system in communicating information that ‘will make the individuals do the desirable
things without anyone having to tell them what to do.’ ”).
157
Jem Bendell, Civil Regulation, in THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 75
(Wayne Visser et al. eds., 2007).
158
Lance Compa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, 30 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 1, 6 (2008).
159
Pitts, supra note 11, at 337 (“This historically unprecedented degree of technologydriven transparency, scrutiny, and accountability is likely the most important and enduring of
all the drivers for CSR.”).
160
Id.
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good ideas that have an impact.”161 Corporations are simply in a better
position to identify and engage in meeting the needs of local communities;
legislation and regulations, particularly on the federal level, would be
unwieldy and inefficient.
There is some indication that in practice, CSR may in fact be moving
naturally towards a corporation-initiated model:
Starbucks isn’t alone in its quest [to launch job programs in
local communities]. The traditional method of corporate
giving, in which companies write checks to charities, is being
replaced by efforts to work directly with communities and
other constituents. According to a recent report from the
Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, a CEOmembership organization dedicated to increasing the level of
corporate giving . . . there are long-term financial benefits to
strengthening communities in which companies do business.162
In sum, business leaders are increasingly aware of the symbiotic relationship
between businesses and their communities—the financial well-being of each
is promoted by the success of the other.
Recent efforts by corporations such as Starbucks to change the way
businesses engage in CSR activities is a step in the right direction because it
recognizes that the most effective CSR programs are led by businesses with a
holistic interest in their communities. It also signifies a move away from
criticism of CSR as mere “public relations” and renders the argument that
CSR is simply a “window-dressing” irrelevant.163
VII. CONCLUSION
The corporate social responsibility movement began with good intentions.
Indeed, its proponents seek the betterment of the individual and society.
However, the increasing role of government in implementing CSR has
hindered, rather than helped, the movement as a whole.
While China’s recent trend toward implementation of CSR is certainly
admirable, the federally mandated legislation and heavy regulation it has
relied on to achieve its CSR goals have only increased bureaucracy. In
161
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reality, CSR in China has been ineffective thus far. Neither has heavyhanded implementation made Chinese CSR significantly more effective than
CSR in the United States. Corporate social responsibility in the U.S., on the
other hand, has taken a tepid approach by granting statutory approval to CSR
and skirting the edge of true CSR regulation without actually taking
affirmative steps to implement it. Neither the approach taken by China nor
the United States approach captures the most effective model of CSR,
because both rely on government action to achieve desired CSR outcomes.
To the contrary, there is evidence that market forces, not government, have
encouraged the development of CSR in China. “Because they are required
by their foreign partners to take responsibility for the social and
environmental impacts of their business activities, Chinese companies are
incentivized to develop CSR awareness.”164
For the reasons discussed above, insurmountable enforcement problems
doom government-mandated CSR. Instead of continuing to tweak an
unworkable government-led model, the United States and China should look
to a corporation-led model that provides the proper incentives for
corporations to protect the interests of their stakeholders through a marketoriented system. Although such a model might not have been feasible in
years past, increasing consumer awareness and technology that can keep
large corporations socially accountable is now readily available in the United
States and rapidly spreading in China. These advancements provide an
effective framework for CSR today.
Furthermore, the underlying principles of CSR already mesh well with
the culture, history, and social philosophies of both China and the United
States. If there truly is popular and well-grounded social support for CSR
practices, such behavior should develop naturally as corporations evolve.
Support exists in the business community for corporate-led CSR that
responds directly to the needs of individuals and communities without the
inevitable delays and distortions caused by government regulation and
process. China and the United States need to adopt a corporate-led approach
to CSR that will allow effective CSR measures to flourish.
As world economic leaders, China and the United States have the
opportunity to influence the rest of the world. By letting companies develop
CSR initiatives that best address the needs of individuals and communities,
the underlying goals of corporate social responsibility—namely more
satisfied consumers, better treatment for workers and the environment, and
more socially engaged corporations—will be achieved.
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A business-led model of corporate social responsibility is the only
practicable model of CSR because it places incentives on the proper actors—
corporations—while eliminating the enforcement problems inherent in
government legislation and regulations that are unevenly applied, as in
China, or that lack teeth or any affirmative effect, as in the United States.
The workable, corporate-driven model does not succumb to the
enforcement problems of government regulation models, but rather surpasses
them in actual effectiveness. Traditional market forces, coupled with greater
technological consumer oversight capabilities, make the corporate-led CSR
model more feasible than ever before. China should begin to repeal its
legislation and regulations enforcing CSR and instead focus on improving
transparency, and allow consumer awareness and involvement to continue to
increase. Likewise, the United States should scale back its more aggressive
corporate social responsibility measures and allow businesses to make CSR
decisions within the bounds of the law.

